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This paper examines the current policy debate around 
the reform of labour laws in India, which has been 
stimulated in part by the success of the “Gujarat model 
of economic development.” Gujarat’s deregulatory 
reforms have included changes to the legal regime 
governing employment terminations, which could form 
a basis for a change in national-level labour laws. 
Evidence linking labour law deregulation to growth, 
however, is weak, whether the focus is on India or the 
experience of other countries. Building labour market 
institutions is a long-term process which requires 
investment in state capacity for the management of risks 
associated with the transition to a formal economy.
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1 Introduction
Labour law reform has come on the political agenda in India, particularly in the wake of the elections in May 2014 of the Narendra Modi-led government at the centre. 
India’s labour laws are decades old and are said to suffer from 
rigidities which are holding back economic development. 
Worker-protective labour laws, it is argued, are deterring invest-
ment and stalling the growth of formal employment. India’s 
labour laws are set at an inappropriately high level for a devel-
oping economy, which would otherwise be in a position to use 
low-cost labour as a source of comparative advantage. The 
strict regulation of employment terminations (“retrenchments”) 
in Part V B of the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) 1947 (as 
amended in 1976) has been a particular focus of criticism. 
Critics of this law argue that as it targets larger plants and 
enterprises for regulation, it discourages the growth of fi rms, 
and contributes to labour informality. 
Viewed in a comparative perspective, India’s recent focus 
on labour law reform is not unique: other middle-income 
countries have been having similar debates about the form 
and content of labour regulation. While these debates some-
times lead to deregulation, there is no worldwide trend 
towards the weakening of worker-protective labour laws 
(Adams and Deakin 2015). Although the discourse of the 
World Bank and other international fi nancial institutions 
remains focused on the need for fl exibility in labour markets, 
there is an emerging view at the country level that labour 
fl exibility is not a suffi cient condition for economic develop-
ment, and perhaps not even a necessary one. Instead the 
focus is increasingly on how to build institutions for manag-
ing labour market risks in the transition to a formal economy 
(Marshall and Fenwick 2015).
In this paper we seek to locate the debate over the future of 
labour law in India in the context of global trends, as seen 
through the lens of recent theoretical and empirical contribu-
tions to the study of labour regulation, and in relation to India’s 
own experiments in regulatory reform, in particular the 
“Gujarat model.” Section 2 outlines the movement of labour 
market theory away from equilibrium-based models, with their 
emphasis on labour law as a distortion of competition, towards 
an evolutionary understanding of labour market institutions, 
which takes a more nuanced view of their effi ciency effects. 
Section 3 reviews empirical evidence on the operation of 
labour law systems, including India’s. Section 4 looks at the 
Gujarat model and its combination of labour law deregulation, 
fi nancial incentives for business and infrastructural investment. 
Section 5 contains the conclusions.
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2 Developments in the Theory of Labour Regulation
Beginning in the 1980s and gathering strength during the 
years of the “Washington Consensus”, the economic critique of 
labour law was part of a wider case against regulation, which 
saw state interference as the source of distortions and ineffi -
ciencies in the operation of markets. This argument depended 
critically on the validity of its main premise, which is that 
markets, if unregulated, will move naturally or spontaneously 
to an equilibrium state. Neoclassical economics, which is the 
foundation of this view, has been highly effective in describing, 
and mathematically modelling, a state of the world in which, 
through perfect competition, supply and demand are equalised, 
and the aggregate wealth (or, in some versions, well-being) of 
market actors is thereby maximised. In such a world, any outside 
interference with free exchange will, by defi nition, have negative 
effects on economic welfare. This follows axiomatically from 
the assumptions of individual rationality (consistent preferences 
coupled with maximisation) and market equilibrium which 
underlie neoclassical models (Becker 1976). 
It is one thing to model pure competition as a possible state 
of the world, and another to assume that it is the norm. Since 
the mathematical formalisation of the competitive market 
economy reached its apogee in the middle decades of the 20th 
century (Arrow and Hahn 1971), economic theory has directed 
its attention towards understanding how market exchange 
comes to be established in the fi rst place, a very different ques-
tion. This research agenda has gradually coalesced around the 
idea that perfect competition is a highly unusual state of affairs 
that it is not often, if indeed ever, replicated in real-life market 
economies (Coase 1988). Meanwhile, the processes by which 
markets are instituted and sustained are still poorly under-
stood, with historical research pointing to a range of causally 
relevant institutions (North 2005).
The reorientation of the social sciences away from the study 
of markets in equilibrium towards analysis of the dynamics of 
institutions and institutional change has signifi cant implications 
for labour markets in general and for the experience of devel-
oping countries in particular. A long tradition in economics, 
dating at least from Adam Smith (1776), recognises that power 
is unevenly distributed within the employment relationship. 
Modern institutional economics generally avoids using the 
term “power” but recognises that labour markets are far from 
perfect. Labour market outcomes are skewed by transaction 
costs arising from uncertainty and incompleteness of contracting 
(Williamson, Wachter and Harris 1975) and by externalities 
arising from asymmetric information (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984). 
Characteristic features of labour market regulations in industrial 
market economies can be understood as evolved responses to 
the coordination problems associated with the distinctive form 
of the employment contract (Deakin and Sarkar 2008). These 
include social insurance (Esping-Andersen 1996), employment 
protection (Acharya, Baghai-Wadji and Subramanian 2014) 
and worker representation (Rogers and Streeck 1995). The 
right to strike, in addition to being framed as a human right 
deriving from the principle of freedom of association, can also 
be analysed as a counterweight to the managerial prerogative 
which law and custom together vest in the employer, with re-
sults that may, in principle, be conducive to the effi cient opera-
tion of the market (Moore 2014).
This point of view does not imply that labour market regula-
tion is always and everywhere effi cient. In the context of 
industrial economies with established institutions, there is a 
debate to be had over the appropriate form of regulation and 
over the degree of worker protection which is compatible with 
the use of the market as a mechanism of resource allocation. 
There may be trade-offs between equity and effi ciency under 
certain circumstances, and complementarities between a 
fairer distribution and sustainable economic growth in others 
(Deakin and Wilkinson 2005). In the fi nal analysis these are 
empirical questions which cannot be addressed through theo-
retical reasoning alone, but a theory grounded in the experi-
ence of real-life economies is to be preferred to one based on 
axiomatic reasoning.
In developing economies, the debate takes a distinct form. 
Where the institutions which might underpin a formal labour 
market are still in the process of emerging, the issue for policy-
makers is, or should be, whether labour laws are likely to 
advance that process, or to hinder it (Marshall 2015). On the 
one hand, there is a case against transplanting into a develop-
ing country context laws which were designed for mature 
industrial systems. In particular, laws which presuppose the 
existence of a formal economy in which wage dependence is 
the norm may have little relevance for economies in which the 
majority of the population relies on access to the land or the 
family for subsistence. 
On the other hand, the transition to a wage-based economy 
with formal labour market relations does not occur in an 
institutional vacuum. Loss of access to traditional means of 
subsistence is compensated for by new forms of mutualisation 
and protection for the working population. In the global North, 
the transition to an industrial economy occurred coterminously 
with the evolution of institutions for managing and diffusing 
labour market risks, including laws on wage regulation, poor 
relief and apprenticeship, which anticipated later features of 
modern welfare states in Europe and North America (Deakin 
and Wilkinson 2005). Thus the claim that developing countries 
have no need of laws to underpin emerging labour market 
institutions, whatever other arguments might be made in its 
favour, is not supported by the historical record of the countries 
which were fi rst to industrialise. On the contrary, it was largely 
through the legal framework that labour capacity, which is not 
a “natural commodity” (Marx 1847; Polanyi 1944), acquired 
the form needed to sustain the complex economic relations 
and deep division of labour of a market economy (Deakin and 
Supiot 2009).
Middle-income countries today are very far from being pure 
subsistence economies. The characteristic pattern is for a 
formal economy consisting of a minority (of varying size) of the 
working population to coexist with a larger informal sector. In 
the informal sector, workers and households tend to rely for 
subsistence on a combination of waged work and access to the 
land and family incomes. Employment in the informal sector is 
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irregular and discontinuous, as well as being insecure in the 
wider sense of providing limited access, at best, to collective 
mechanisms for sharing and diffusing labour market risks. In 
economies with this type of mix, it is far from clear that labour 
laws are irrelevant to the operation of the economy. Even 
when reliance on wage labour is partial or incomplete, laws 
which regularise the hiring process, protect the right to wages 
and permit workers to self-organise for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining can address needs of workers in the informal 
sector for greater income security. Similarly, bringing informal 
enterprises into the coverage of social insurance systems can 
help mitigate the economic risks to which informal sector 
workers are exposed.
Much has been made of the argument that poverty in deve-
loping countries is the result of the failure of the legal system 
to recognise the interests of the poor in land and other tangible 
assets which could, with appropriate legal title, be used as 
collateral (De Soto 2000). The limited success of land titling 
programmes to date suggests that the simple equation of legal 
rights with developmental capacity is misplaced (Haldar and 
Stiglitz 2013). 
While there may be many reasons in practice for the failure 
of land titling to realise hoped-for economic benefi ts, the 
insight that the legal system plays a signifi cant role in support-
ing economic exchange in middle-income countries is not 
necessarily mistaken (Chen and Deakin 2015). But it is striking 
that the proponents of legal formality in credit and capital 
markets should have had little to say about the role the legal 
system could play in promoting access to labour markets in 
middle-income countries. There is an inconsistency in regard-
ing credit as an institutional commodity when labour power is 
seen as a natural one, requiring nothing more than the free 
play of market forces. This omission is the more surprising 
since extending wage protection and social insurance systems 
has the potential to benefi t a far higher proportion of the 
working-age population in these countries than can be reached 
through land titling schemes. 
3 Empirical Evidence on the Economic Effects 
of Labour Laws
Just as theory has moved on since the high point of the 
“Washington Consensus,” the same trend can be observed in the 
empirical literature on labour regulation. In the late 1990s and 
early 2000s a small but infl uential literature appeared to have 
settled the debate in favour of the supporters of deregulation 
and labour market fl exibility. Fallon and Lucas (1999), using a 
cross-national panel data analysis, found evidence of a nega-
tive relationship between worker-protective labour law and 
labour demand in a number of countries, including India. This 
fi nding was repeated in the larger panel data set of labour laws 
across the world constructed by Botero et al (2004). Of most 
signifi cance for India was the study carried out by Besley and 
Burgess (2004), which found evidence of a negative impact on 
employment and investment of the adoption of worker-protec-
tive laws at the sub-national (state) level. This study has been 
used to support claims that labour laws are one of the factors 
contributing to the relatively small size of the formal economy 
in India, which in 2014 accounts for less than 10% of the total 
labour force.
Much has been written on the Besley–Burgess study. On one 
view, the methodology used to measure differences in state-level 
labour laws is insuffi ciently robust to justify clear conclusions 
being drawn from their analysis (Bhattarcharjea 2006, 2009; 
Jha and Golder 2008). On another, once the Besley–Burgess 
index is corrected for coding errors, the same negative impact 
of labour laws is found (Ahsan and Pagés 2009). Even so, the 
results of the original study do not survive once account is 
taken of limited effectiveness, including court delays and dif-
fi culties of accessing the judicial system, in the enforcement of 
labour laws in India (Fagernäs 2010). The econometric method 
used to test for correlations between the scores in the index 
and outcome variables measuring employment and invest-
ment has also been called into question (D’Souza 2010). There 
is evidence that insofar as there is a correlation between worker-
protective labour laws and economic indicators, changes in the 
law are endogenous to those in the wider economy. Thus for 
the most part, Indian labour law has largely been responsive to 
wider factors in the economy, rather than a determining cause 
of them (Dutta Roy 2004; Deakin and Sarkar 2011).
An obstacle to achieving a better understanding of the role 
of labour law in economic development has been the lack of 
data that can track changes in the legal framework over time 
in both developed and developing countries. The most widely 
used index for employment protection law is the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD). Employ-
ment Protection Index (EPI) (OECD, various years). However, it 
does not cover many developing countries, and while its ambit 
has recently been extended to include some systems outside 
the OECD, it does not provide a continuous time series for these 
countries. India and China, for example, are coded from 2008 
only, and Brazil from 2010. The World Bank’s Employing 
Workers Index (EWI) provides longitudinal data on dismissal 
regulation (among other things) going back to the 2000s 
(World Bank, various years), but has been subject to criticism 
for its methodology (Manuel Report 2013), in particular its focus 
on the regulations governing a standard employment relation-
ship of full-time, permanent work which is not typical, in prac-
tice, for emerging markets. In both the EPI and EWI, data are 
based on mixture of survey evidence and analysis of legal 
materials, making it hard to discern the source of the codings. 
The Centre for Business Research Labour Regulation Index 
(CBR–LRI) is a data set constructed by researchers at Cambridge 
University (including one of the present authors) which pro-
vides a continuous time series on country-level changes in 
labour law going back to the early 1970s (or late 1980s/early 
1990s in the case of former socialist systems) (for explanations 
of the methodology used in the construction of the data set, 
see Deakin, Lele and Siems 2007; Adams and Deakin 2015). 
The data in CBR–LRI are based on content analysis of legal 
texts and other primary sources of labour law rules, using a 
coding algorithm designed to capture gradations of labour 
protection (so that on a 0–1 scale, a higher score indicates a 
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greater degree of protection for the worker). As such, the data 
set can only capture cross-national variations in the formal 
(de jure) law, but it can be combined with other indices, in-
cluding the World Bank’s Rule of Law Index (World Bank 2015), 
to give a more complete picture of the operation of the law 
(Deakin and Sarkar 2008; Deakin, Malmberg and Sarkar 
2014; Deakin, Fenwick and Sarkar 2014). 
Table 1 sets out the scores in the CBR–LRI sub-index on dis-
missal protection for India (variables 25–31 out of a larger index 
consisting of 40 individual indicators). The explanations for 
Table 1: Dismissal Protection in India, 1970–2013
Variable Template Score Explanation
Legally-mandated notice  Measures the length of notice, in weeks, that has  1970–75: 0.33 From 1970 the rule was one month or 4.3 weeks: Industrial
period (all dismissals) to be given to a worker with three years’ employment.    Disputes Act (IDA) s 25F.  From 1976 it was three months for an
 Normalise the score so that 0 weeks = 0 and  1976–2013: 1 employee with one year’s service in an establishment employing
 12 weeks = 1.  300 workers, reduced to 100 from 1984: IDA s 25N, eventually  
   declared constitutional in 1992 (Meenaskhi Mills 1992),   
   although before then it was effectively in force in a number of states.
Legally-mandated  Measures the amount of redundancy compensation 1970–2013: 0.5 IDA s 25F provides that for a retrenchment to be lawful, 
redundancy  or severance pay payable to a worker made redundant  compensation must be paid at the rate of 15 days’ average 
compensation after three years of employment, measured in weeks of pay.   pay for every year of service.
 Normalise the score so that 0 weeks = 0 and 
 12 weeks = 1. 
Minimum qualifying  Measures the period of service required before a 1970–2013: 0.67 One year qualifying period for procedural protection and
period of service for  worker qualifies for general protection against  right to compensation for retrenchment (s 25N IDA).
normal case of unjust  unjust dismissal.  Normalise the score so that
dismissal three years or more  = 0, 0 months = 1 
Law imposes procedural Equals 1 if a dismissal is necessarily unjust if the 1970–2013: 1 Under the IDA, disciplinary proceedings must precede dismissal 
constraints on dismissal employer fails to follow procedural requirements   for misconduct.  The workman must be informed of the alleged
 prior to dismissal. Equals 0.67 if failure to follow    misconduct in writing and be given an opportunity to respond. 
 procedural  requirements will normally lead to a finding Various formalities must be followed. See Industrial Employment
 of unjust dismissal.  Equals 0.33 if failure to follow      (Standing Orders) Central Rules 1946, and extensive case law 
 procedural requirement is just one factor taken into  (Barot vs State Transport Corporation (1966), Brooke Bond India
 account in unjust dismissal cases. Equals 0 if there are  vs Choudhary (1969), Chandulai vs Pan Am (1985)). 
 no procedural requirements for dismissal. Scope for 
 gradations between 0 and 1 to reflect changes in 
 the strength of the law.  
Law imposes substantive  Equals 1 if dismissal is only permissible for serious 1970–2013: 0.33 The court will intervene where there is lack of good faith, 
constraints on dismissal misconduct or fault of the employee. Equals 0.67   a breach of natural justice, an error of fact, or in the case
 if dismissal is lawful according to a wider range of   of a perverse finding: Industrial Employment (Standing
 legitimate reasons (misconduct, lack of capability,   Orders) Central Rules 1946; extensive case law beginning
 redundancy, etc).  Equals 0.33 if dismissal is permissible  with Indian Iron and Steel Co (1958)); IDA s11A, inserted in 1976.
 if it is “just” or “fair” as defined by case law. Equals 0 if 
 employment is at will (i e, no cause dismissal is 
 normally permissible). Scope for gradations between 
 0 and 1 to reflect changes in the strength of the law. 
Reinstatement normal  Equals 1 if reinstatement is the normal remedy for 1970–2013:0.33 IDA 1947, s 11A, inserted in 1976, formally gave labour courts
remedy for unfair  unjust dismissal and is regularly enforced.    the power to grant reinstatement as the ordinary remedy for
dismissal Equals 0.67 if reinstatement and compensation are,   1976–2013: 0.67 dismissal, although the courts have been reluctant to grant it
 de jure and de facto, alternative remedies.  Equals 0.33   e g, where to do so would be contrary to industrial peace
 if compensation is the normal remedy. Equals 0 if no   (Tulsidas Paul 1964).
 remedy is available as of right. Scope for further 
 gradations between 0 and 1 to reflect changes in the 
 strength of the law. 
Notification of dismissal Equals 1 if by law or binding collective agreement the  1970–1975: 0.67 Between 1970 and 1975, under s 25F IDA, the employer had
 employer has to obtain the permission of a state body   to notify the state authorities, give one month’s notice in
 or third body prior to an individual dismissal.  1976–2013: 1 writing, and pay compensation to the employee.  Under
 Equals 0.67 if a state body or third party has to be   s 25N IDA, inserted in 1976, government permission and
 notified prior to the dismissal.  Equals 0.33 if the employer    three months’ notice were required for retrenchments in
 has to give the worker written reasons for the dismissal.   establishments of 300 or more employees, reduced to 100
 Equals 0 if an oral statement of dismissal to the worker   from 1984.  
 suffices.  Scope for further gradations between 0 and 
 1 to reflect changes in the strength of the law. 
Redundancy selection  Equals 1 if by law or binding collective agreement  1970–2013: 1 The employer should follow the rule of seniority implied by
 the employer must follow priority rules based on   the “last in, first out” rule: s 25G IDA.
 seniority, marital status, number or dependants, etc, 
 prior to dismissing for redundancy.  Equals 0 otherwise. 
 Scope for further  gradations between 0 and 1 to 
 reflect changes in the strength of the law.   
Priority in re-employment Equals 1 if by law or binding collective agreement the 1970–2013: 1 There is a right to priority in re-employment on the part of
  employer must follow priority rules relating to the   retrenched workers: s 25H IDA.
 re-employment of former workers.  Equals 0 otherwise.  
 Scope for further gradations between 0 and 1 to 
 reflect changes in the strength of the law. 
Source: CBR Labour Regulation Index (Deakin, Lele and Siems 2007; Adams and Deakin 2015).
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the codings are provided at the point when the law changes (or 
from 1970, if it was in force at that point). The indicators cover 
the normal content of rules governing employment protection, 
including those regulating the minimum period of notice 
that the employer must give; entitlement to redundancy or 
severance pay; qualifying or arbitration periods; procedural and 
substantive standards relating to terminations; notifi cation of 
dismissal; redundancy selection; and priority 
in rehiring. The provisions of the IDA 1947 as 
amended in 1976 are refl ected in the high 
scores attributed to India for this part of 
the sub-index. 
Some sense of India’s position in compari-
son to other deve loped and developing coun-
tries can be obtained from Figures 1 and 2. 
India’s dismissal laws are at the more protec-
tive end of the scale when compared to devel-
oping countries such as Germany and the UK, 
although they are not stricter than those of 
France. In relation to middle-income coun-
tries (Figure 2), India has again scored more 
highly for worker protection, but the reforms 
made in China by the Labour Contract Act 
2007 have removed the gap between these 
two countries, at least as far as the formal law 
is concerned. Changes made in the Labour 
Contract Act include a signifi cant strength-
ening of procedural and substantive stand-
ards affecting dismissals and the introduc-
tion of rules on redundancy selection and 
priority in re-employment. The 2007 law 
also makes provision for trade unions to be 
consulted over dismissals and for the union 
to seek rectifi cation of a dismissal carried out 
in breach of procedure.
Averaging the scores in the CBR–LRI across 
countries for a range of variables over a period 
of years can give a broad-brush impression of 
trends, but may also gloss over relevant dif-
ferences. The aspect of Indian labour laws 
which has given rise to most discussion and 
criticism is the requirement of government 
permission for large-scale retrenchments, 
contained in Section 25N of the IDA. On the 
coding algorithm used in the CBR–LRI, this change, made in 
1976, makes Indian labour law among the most worker-
protective in the world, but it by no means is the only country 
with a high level of legal protection for workers in matters 
of dismissal. 
Table 2 sets out in summary form the content of similar laws 
in other developed and developing countries. Nearly all have a 
Figure 1: Dismissal Laws in Selected Developed Countries
Source: CBR Labour Regulation Index (see note to Table 1).
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Figure 2: Dismissal Laws in Selected Developing Countries  
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Table 2: Rules on Notification of Dismissals in Selected Countries, 1970–2013
Country Score Explanation
Brazil 1970–89: 0 Under Art 477 of the Code on Labour Law, amended in 1990, a 
termination will only be valid if certain formalities are observed,  
including submission of a termination form to the Ministry of Labour.
China 1986–94: 0.5 Under the Provisional Regulations on Labour Relations (1986), the 
employer had to consult the trade union and make a report of the
 1995–2007: 0.75 dismissal to the administrative authorities and to the labour office.  
Labour Law 1994 Art 30 gave the trade union the right to make
 2008–13: 1 representations to the employer in a case where it considered 
termination to be inappropriate.  The Labour Contract Law 2007 refers 
to notification to both the union and the public authorities in the 
case of both collective and individual dismissals.  If the employer 
violates  the law the trade union has the right to require rectification 
and the employer must consider the trade union’s view and notify it 
of how it handled the matter.
France 1970–72: 0 Under Law 75–5, the authorisation of a state body was required for
economic dismissals, including individuals ones (Labour Code Art L
 1973–74: 0.33 321–7). From 1986, this was replaced by a duty to notify the relevant
 1975–85: 1 state body.  See now LC Art L 1233–115.  Act No 75–5, codified as LC
 1986–2013: 0.67 Art L122–14–1, provided that written reasons had to be given to the 
employee. See now LC Art L 1232–6.
Germany 1970–71: 0.5 Until 1972: §§ 65, 66(1) BetrVG (Works Constitution Act) stipulated 
that notification to the works council was necessary, but it was 
 1972: 0.67  controversial whether violation of this norm affected the validity of 
dismissal (see Söllner, Arbeitsrecht, 3rd edn, 1972, p 164).  § 102(1) 
BetrVG of 15 January 1972 (BGBl. I 1972, 13): violation does affect 
validity.
India 1970–75: 0.67 Between 1970 and 1975, under s 25F Industrial Disputes Act, the
 1976–2013: 1 employer had to notify the state authorities, give one month’s notice 
in writing, and pay compensation to the employee.  Under s 25N 
IDA, inserted in 1976, government permission and 3 months’ notice 
were required for retrenchments in establishments of 300 or more 
employees, reduced to 100 from 1984.  
Japan 1970–2013: 0 There is no legal requirement for notification of dismissals.
Russia 1992–2013: 0.33 Notification in writing to the employee (see now Art.180, Labour Code).
South  Africa 1970–2013: 0.33 Notification to the worker has been the norm in respect of individual 
dismissals under successive versions of the Labour Relations Act.
UK 1970–71: 0 The normal rule since the inception of the unfair dismissal jurisdiction
 1972–2013: 0.33 in 1971 (see now Employment Rights Act 1996) is that the employee 
must be given written reasons in writing.
US 1970–88: 0 Written notice must be given to the exclusive representative or 
bargaining agent of affected employees or to unrepresented
 1989–2013: 0.67 individual workers under the provisions of the Workplace Adjustment, 
  Retraining and Notification Act 1988.
Source: CBR Labour Regulation Index (see note to Table 1). 
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notifi cation law of some kind. France required administrative 
permission for dismissals between 1975 and 1986. This require-
ment was repealed in 1986 and replaced by an obligation to 
notify a state body, while also leaving intact the right of a dis-
missed worker to seek compensation or (less usually) rein-
statement before a labour court. In Germany, notifi cation of 
dismissal to the works council is required, and failure to com-
ply with the process laid down for notifi cation can lead to the 
nullifi cation of the dismissal under certain circumstances. 
When administrative permission was needed in France, 
prior to 1986, it was normal for it to be granted if the employer 
could demonstrate a prima facie case for the dismissal and if 
procedural requirements were followed. The move away from 
administrative oversight was accompanied by a strengthening 
of protection for the worker in the context of individual claims 
and by a growing role for collective worker voice on issues of 
dismissal. Thus it is not clear that the change of approach gave 
employers more leeway over dismissals than they had before. 
In some ways they may have had less once the certainty of 
administrative approvals was no longer available. In Germany, 
although the works council can, in principle, exercise a veto 
power over a dismissal, this very rarely happens in practice. 
Works council approval is sometimes used by employers to 
provide legitimacy for dismissals which might otherwise have 
been questioned.
Thus in the European approach, laws on notifi cation of 
dismissal generally do not constitute an absolute bar on employ-
ment terminations. Rather, they serve to proceduralise the dis-
missal decision, in the sense of subjecting it to standards of 
fairness whose application is worked out on a case by case basis. It 
is an open question whether such laws hinder or assist employers. 
One view is that by legitimising dismissals, their overall effect 
is to strengthen managerial prerogative (Collins 1995).
In the Indian context, the requirement of state permission 
contained in Section 25N of the IDA may have been operated 
somewhat more strictly than its equivalents in western 
Europe. Empirical research (Ahsan and Pagés 2009) suggests 
that the law has in the past provided a disincentive to employ-
ers to increase numbers in employment over the threshold at 
which the requirement is triggered (300 workers from 1976; 
100 from 1984). A case may therefore be made for modifying 
the IDA’s notifi cation requirements. 
However, as we have seen, it is unusual for labour law 
systems to make no provision of any kind for notifi cation. 
When formal administrative permission for terminations was 
removed in France in the mid-1980s, this was against the back-
drop of a dismissal law which in other respects continued to 
provide signifi cant procedural and substantive safeguards 
against dismissal, enforceable through recourse to the labour 
court (the conseil de prud’hommes). In Germany, the involve-
ment of collective employee representatives in the dismissal 
process provides a check on the employer’s termination power. 
In the Indian context, given the delays affecting court claims 
and the absence of a codetermination law or its equivalent, 
there can be no guarantee that the repeal of Section 25N would 
allow a similar shift from one mode of regulation to another.
Reform of Part V B of the IDA should also take account of the 
growing empirical literature on the operation of employment 
protection laws in Europe and North America. Although this is 
a developing fi eld, the literature by no means points to a 
deregulatory agenda (for an overview, see Adams and Deakin 
2015). In studies making use of the CBR–LRI data set, dismissal 
protection is seen to encourage innovation based on workers’ 
fi rm-specifi c skills and knowledge (Archarya et al 2014). 
Worker-protective dismissal regulation is generally correlated 
with improvements in productivity. In some countries (notably 
the United States), this results in reduced employment growth, 
as tighter controls over dismissal raise hiring costs, but in others 
(notably Germany), where dismissal laws operate alongside 
laws mandating vocational and educational training, these 
disemployment effects have been avoided (Deakin and Sarkar 
2008). The provisional conclusion to be drawn from this litera-
ture is that dismissal laws may be conducive to employment 
growth where they operate alongside institutions to promote 
investment in human capital. Dismissal protection, along 
with laws mandating employee voice at work and collective 
bargaining over wages and terms and conditions, has also 
been shown to favour more egalitarian outcomes, in terms of 
the relative shares of wages and profi ts in national income (the 
“labour share”), and by reference to the Gini coeffi cient, which is 
a general measure of economic inequality (Deakin, Malmberg 
and Sarkar 2014; Deakin, Fenwick and Sarkar 2014).
4 The Gujarat Model
The “Gujarat model” of development has become a byword in 
development and economic policy circles since Narendra Modi’s 
election as prime minister on 16 May 2014. The focal point of 
Modi’s electoral campaign was the promise that he would do 
for India as a whole what he did for his home state, Gujarat. 
Over his decade-long period at the helm since 2001, the state 
acquired the reputation of being unparalleled in its “pro-business” 
approach, by offering a package of improved infrastructure 
(especially roads, but also ports) and good governance 
(reduced corruption and a streamlined bureaucracy, often 
achieved by means of innovative use of technology as in the 
case of the Jan Vikas Kendra simplifying certifi cation processes, 
or the E-Jamin scheme for digitising land records). Land and 
labour were offered on favourable terms to businesses, includ-
ing through the creation of special economic zones (SEZs) 
which were set up via forced land acquisition on a large scale. 
Under the Gujarat Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act 2004 
and the Gujarat Special Economic Zone Act of the same year, 
the bulk of national labour law was disapplied in the SEZs. 
In particular, Part V B of the IDA was replaced by a more 
liberal regime for employment terminations, under which the 
requirement of administrative authorisation for dismissals 
was replaced by a limited right to compensation for workers 
with a year or more of continuous employment. Further 
incentivisation was provided through “assistance packages” 
for investments over a certain amount. The Gujarat govern-
ment currently advertises “path-breaking labour laws” along-
side “facilities and fi scal benefi ts” (mostly exemptions from 
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taxes and planning rules) for fi rms relocating to its SEZs 
(Government of Gujarat 2014).
There is, however, considerable dispute with respect to 
the nature of the Gujarat model. During the general election 
campaign, industry and investment, infrastructure and power 
were presented by its supporters as the key features of the 
model. Industrial growth appears to have jumped to 12.65% 
per annum in the period 2005–09, from 3.95% in the period 
2001–04. Agricultural reform, channelled mainly through 
improvements in infrastructure (power, water, roads), also 
appears to have worked, with annual average growth rates in 
agricultural production of 10.97%, the highest of any Indian 
state between 2001 and 2010. Improvements in healthcare and 
women’s empowerment are also emphasised by the model’s 
supporters, although gains on these fronts are more contentious. 
Managing to outcompete several other Indian states in bids for 
international and domestic investment, Gujarat has established 
itself as a major industrial hub and manufacturing centre, becom-
ing home to major industrial houses like Reliance and Essar, 
and developing a special competence in automobiles with 
investments from Maruti Suzuki and the Tatas. The obvious 
contrast to the Gujarat model in policy terms is West Bengal, 
ruled for the majority of the history of post-independence 
India by the Communist Party that was elected to power on the 
back of a widespread land redistribution policy, and associated 
with extremely stringent labour laws and support for trade 
unions. The weak economic performance of West Bengal, 
despite its illustrious history, rich endowment of natural 
resources and advantages of geographical location, has become a 
cautionary tale of the ills associated with an overprotective 
government apparatus. The contrasting approaches of the two 
states were underscored dramatically by the defection of the 
Tata Nano car factory from West Bengal to Gujarat in 2008, in 
the wake of violent protests about forced land acquisition in 
the Singur region. 
The Gujarat model can also be contrasted with the Kerala 
model that has long been prominent in development discourses. 
Unlike the Kerala model, that became famous for its high 
attainment in human development-type welfare indicators 
(notably 100% literacy), the Gujarat model is more focused on 
traditional models of economic success, parti cularly high 
growth rates. Indeed, it was the contrast between these two 
trajectories of development that was the focal point of the 
Sen–Bhagwati debate (Dreze and Sen 2013; Bhagwati and 
Panagariya 2012) in the run-up to the general elections. 
Thus the Gujarat model seems to exemplify the wisdom of the 
“rule of law” orthodoxy, providing empirical evidence of the 
idea that a process of rationalising institutions and a regime of 
deregulation, focused on a minimal institutional structure pro-
viding clarity and certainty in the realms of property and con-
tract, will bear fruit in terms of economic growth and prosper-
ity. Indeed, it is this perspective that has informed the national 
government’s initial labour law reforms of October 2014, which 
include streamlining databases of companies, modifying pro-
cedures for reporting on compliance with labour regulations, 
and reducing the discretion of inspectors. So far, the government 
has not proposed a more fundamental change to Part V B of the 
IDA, but this remains an option for the future in what appears 
to be a cautious approach to the sequencing of reforms.
Before Gujarat is accepted as an undisputed “gold standard” for 
Indian economic policy, however, there are a few points that 
should be considered. To begin with, an extensive literature 
indicates that the dynamics of institutional replication are more 
complex than they may initially appear (Berkowitz et al 2003a, 
2003b). The apparent success of a certain set of economic policies 
in the context of Gujarat may be due to local factors such as a long-
established entrepreneurial tradition in that state and advantages 
of geographical location that do not apply in other contexts. 
The more fundamental question, however, is whether the 
transposition of the model onto the national platform would 
be desirable even if it were achievable. On this front, the fi rst 
thing that is worth noting is that the key point on which the 
model has built itself is reform in land, labour and credit markets. 
As Polanyian scholarship emphasises, land, labour and money 
are not “pure commodities.” Attempts to construct a market 
economy require the creation of institutional capacity and not 
simply the removal of government controls (Polanyi 1944). In 
this context it is unclear what is distinctive about the Gujarat 
model, and what it offers beyond a policy of liberalisation and 
deregulation combined with subsidies for plant relocations 
which can by their nature be only temporary. 
Nor is it clear that Gujarat’s deregulatory approach should 
be credited with the growth it has achieved. Other Indian 
states, including Maharashtra, have grown as quickly as 
Gujarat or even surpassed it. Thus the idea of the Gujarat model 
is a unique path to unparalleled growth may be questioned. 
Finally, while adopting the model in Gujarat may have led to 
positive outcomes in terms of growth, the model entails some 
questionable trade-offs: there may have been gains in the ag-
gregate, but this says little about how those gains are divided 
up (for instance what proportion of them accrues to labour). 
Serious questions and concerns remain about the inclusivity of 
the model, and about social indicators (on health, education, 
infant mortality, and women’s literacy) lagging behind the 
economic ones. Gujarat’s scores on the Human Development 
Index place it below the national average, so that it is still 
classifi ed as a “less developed state.” The Union Ministry of 
Health and Family Welfare estimates that the shortage of doc-
tors in Gujarat is 34%, compared with the national average of 
10%, while one child in three in Gujarat is reported to be mal-
nourished on 2013 estimates. 
5 Conclusions
The Gujarat model emphasises the streamlining of governance 
structures as the pathway to development, with the deregula-
tion of labour laws a key element of this process. The state 
appears to have reaped signifi cant benefi ts from this approach 
in terms of attracting investment and augmenting growth. It is 
consequently a noteworthy model, and its successes are worth 
studying. However, implicit in the model are a range of normative 
and policy choices that need to be examined carefully before 
adopting it as a template for the entire country. 
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In particular, it is not clear that a policy of deregulation and 
subsidisation of business through fi scal exemptions is sustain-
able over the longer term. This strategy may produce some quick 
wins for state governments keen to attract inward investment, 
but it will not lead to sustainable growth unless it is coupled 
with investment in institutional capacity. For the labour 
market, this means supporting the institutions through which 
human capital is created and sustained, in particular, educa-
tion and training systems, and social insurance. Without such 
changes, it is unlikely that access to the formal employment 
will become a reality for more than a small minority of Indian 
workers, as it is at present. There may be a case for modulating 
the strict controls over employment terminations set out in 
Part V B of the IDA. However, removing all regulation of the 
termination decision and leaving workers with a limited fi nancial 
claim following dismissal is unlikely to encourage investment 
in fi rm-specifi c skills. Such an extensive deregulation of dis-
missal protection would do little to help fi rms remain competi-
tive over the long run. For India to embed the Gujarat approach 
to labour law at national level at a time when other middle-
income countries, including China, are strengthening employ-
ment protection rights, would raise many questions over the 
direction of policy.
The Gujarat model also poses some diffi cult questions over 
potential trade-offs between equity and effi ciency. Weakening 
workers’ rights is generally regressive in distributional terms, 
and economic growth without social cohesion comes at a 
wider cost. For India’s policymakers, labour law reform poses 
the question of whether growth is to be seen as an end in itself 
or a means to other ends. 
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